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The Impact of the Arab Spring on Islamist Strategies
Abstract
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt created a contagion effect that inspired a series of
uprisings by sending two signals: first, that even entrenched authoritarian regimes are
vulnerable; and second, that nonviolent tactics can be effective in bringing about dramatic
political changes. Subsequent developments, especially in Libya and Syria, convoluted
these messages. Nonetheless, the political openings and the electoral victory of Islamists in
Egypt and Tunisia continue to send the signal to many Islamist opposition groups that
nonviolent means and participation in politics can be effective ways to produce political
change. The chance of gaining power through electoral means can give Islamists strong
incentives to join in the demands for democratic institutions and change their stance
towards political participation. The appeal of nonviolent tactics, however, is undermined
when external threats surpass domestic considerations. When the primary concern of the
public is about outside threats and the main enemy is external rather than a domestic
despot, the impact of the Arab Spring on views regarding the efficacy of nonviolent tactics
is diminished. Similarly, when an Islamic group is primarily concerned with the "far enemy,"
the incentives for moderation offered by political participation are undermined.
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Abstract
The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt created a contagion effect that
inspired a series of uprisings by sending two signals: first, that even
entrenched authoritarian regimes are vulnerable; and second, that nonviolent tactics can be effective in bringing about dramatic political changes.
Subsequent developments, especially in Libya and Syria, convoluted these
messages. Nonetheless, the political openings and the electoral victory of
Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia continue to send the signal to many Islamist opposition groups that nonviolent means and participation in politics
can be effective ways to produce political change. The chance of gaining
power through electoral means can give Islamists strong incentives to join
in the demands for democratic institutions and change their stance
towards political participation. The appeal of nonviolent tactics, however,
is undermined when external threats surpass domestic considerations.
When the primary concern of the public is about outside threats and the
main enemy is external rather than a domestic despot, the impact of the
Arab Spring on views regarding the efficacy of nonviolent tactics is diminished. Similarly, when an Islamic group is primarily concerned with the
"far enemy," the incentives for moderation offered by political participation are undermined.

Introduction
The speed with which protests spread and regimes crumbled across the
Middle East and North Africa in 2011 surprised many scholars and forced
them to reflect on why their theories hadn't predicted the Arab Spring.
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This trend is all too reminiscent of the scholarly debates after the fall of
communism in Eastern Europe, when the rapid turn of events surpassed
theoretical expectations. However, in the early 1990s, the international
community was euphoric at the prospect of a "democratic domino effect"
and believed that the fall of communism signaled the dawn of a new era
for international security. While there was initially much enthusiasm
about an Arab wave of democratization, policymakers and scholars
remain much less certain about the impact of the Arab Spring on regional
and international security. This article seeks to tackle this issue by examining the impact of the Arab Spring on the strategies of Islamist groups
that have employed violent tactics to pursue their goals. The article argues
that the political openings and the electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt
and Tunisia continue to send the signal to Islamist opposition groups that
nonviolent means and participation in politics can be more effective than
violent insurrection. However, when the primary concern is about outside
threats and the main enemy is external rather than a domestic despot, the
impact of the Arab Spring on views regarding the efficacy of nonviolent
tactics is diminished.
The first section of the article briefly examines the dynamics of contagion
effects and why the protests spread so rapidly across the Middle East and
North Africa. Understanding the mechanisms of the revolutionary cascade is important because it signals that nonviolent tactics have wide public appeal across the region. The second section examines the case of
Egypt in order to explore how the political changes in the region have
made nonviolent strategies particularly appealing to Islamist groups. The
third section reflects upon the limitations of this contagion effect, considering the impact of the Arab Spring in the Palestinian Territories and
drawing some comparisons to other cases.

Then and Now: Dominoes, Cascades and the Spread
of Nonviolent Resistance
Before the events of 2011, many political scientists who studied the Middle East and North Africa tended to believe in the durability of authoritarianism in the region.1 It comes as no surprise, then, that area specialists
are now asking where they went wrong.2 At the Middle East Studies Association annual convention in 2011, one of the best-attended panels forced
scholars to rethink their theories and question what had became almost
conventional thinking (the panel was entitled "The Stability of the
Authoritarian Arab Regime?"). Still, such an element of surprise is not a
new phenomenon for academics. Only two decades ago, scholars studying
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were asking almost identical ques28

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss2/7
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.2.2</p>

Matesan: The Impact of the Arab Spring on Islamist Strategies

The Impact of the Arab Spring on Islamist Strategies

tions. In 1991, Timur Kuran suggested that revolutions are inherently difficult to predict because of the interaction of social and psychological
factors.3 His explanation of how protests escalate lies in the argument
that individuals participating in protests can set off a chain reaction that
can generate a revolutionary bandwagon by making people believe that
removing a regime is a possibility.
This argument is still highly relevant today, as we seek to understand the
rapid spread of demonstrations across the Middle East. Drawing on
insights from Patel, Bunce, and Wolchick,4 Eva Bellin suggests that two
logics are at work in the contagion effect that we have witnessed in the
Arab Spring: the logic of deliberate diffusion, which refers to the conscious sharing of tactics by activists; and the logic of the demonstration
effect, which suggests that successful precedents can set off waves of optimism and euphoria that become more powerful than rational considerations about risks and benefits.5 In addition to this emotional dimension,
however, Bellin recognizes that the sense of impunity played a crucial
role, and that demonstrations spread drastically once people in Tunisia
realized that the army would not shoot.6
Building on these arguments, Bellin's theories suggest that events in
Tunisia set off a chain reaction in the region by sending two signals: first,
that even entrenched authoritarian regimes are vulnerable and sensitive
to public pressures; and second, that nonviolent tactics can be effective in
bringing about dramatic political changes. Revolutions ultimately occur
because of specific local grievances. Nonetheless, the ignition can be
sparked by events outside of the country when they send the signal that
public pressure is indeed effective and when they raise public suspicion
about the resilience of the regime.
Simply seeing people protesting is not enough. Before the January 2011
events in Tunisia, there had been significant, prolonged protests in
Greece that received international media attention, yet they didn't spark
any revolutionary cascades. The protests in Iran in 2009, which were
crushed by the regime, also didn't spark any regional revolutions. Egypt
experienced regular demonstrations staged by groups such as the Kefaya
movement or the workers in Mahala well before the events in Tunisia, yet
these mobilizations did not explode into a revolutionary movement. Tunisia ignited the revolutionary spark when it sent the signal that the military
can be on the side of the people and that regimes can be toppled. Looking
at the sequence of events, the protests in Tunisia started in December
2010 and escalated into January 2011, but Egypt did not emulate these
demonstrations until after Tunisian President Ben Ali fled the country. In
fact, only three days after the Tunisian President was ousted, on January
29
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17, an Egyptian man set himself on fire near the parliament building in
Cairo,7 and activists started planning a "day of anger."8 Similarly, events
in Egypt did not immediately spark sustained protests in other countries
until it became clear that the Egyptian army was not taking Mubarak's
side and that the president had resigned. Thus, the revolutionary zeal in
Tunisia and Egypt became contagious when it sent the signal that nonviolent demonstrations can be effective and that regimes are more vulnerable than people perceived them to be. From this perspective, then, the
initial message that Tunisia and Egypt sent to other government opposition movements across the region was that nonviolent resistance can be
more effective and less costly than often assumed or perceived, especially
when the military does not support a regime unconditionally.9
Scholars have identified several mechanisms through which nonviolent
resistance becomes effective. Nonviolent action can produce revolutionary political change by undermining the power, resources, and legitimacy
of the state.10 Stephan and Chenoweth argue that nonviolent tactics
enhance the domestic and international legitimacy of their protagonists
and encourage broad-based participation. This level of mobilization also
implies increased pressure on the regime and makes violent suppression
more costly and more likely to backfire.11 The repression of unarmed
civilians, unlike the repression of armed insurrections, can increase commitment to the struggle, lead to divisions with the political elites and
security forces, and raise international pressures against the regime.12 In
their large-N analysis that compares the effectiveness of violent and nonviolent resistance worldwide, Stephan and Chenoweth find that nonviolent strategies have been successful 53 percent of the time, compared to
the 26 percent success rate of violent strategies.13
Within the context of the Arab Spring, since the revolutions in Egypt and
Tunisia, the brutal repression in Libya and Syria raised doubts about the
effectiveness of nonviolent tactics. The setbacks in the rest of the region
demonstrate that, in spite of the contagion effect on the side of activists
and masses pushing for democratization, outcomes are determined not
just by the strength of the pro-democratic forces. The turn of events is
also shaped by the stance of the military, the extent to which political
actors who seek to maintain the status quo push back, and the willingness
of the revolt to fight the powers that be. As Kriesberg points out, one of
the dangers of a wave of protests of the type witnessed during the Arab
Spring is that the messages being diffused can be misguided; activists
might overestimate their impact or have overly ambitious goals, whereas
governments might underestimate the backlash to violent suppression.14

30
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Countries like Libya, Syria, and Bahrain have proven that regimes in the
Middle East vary greatly in terms of their security apparatus, repressive
capabilities, external support, and actors who have a stake in the status
quo. Bellin suggests that what has been crucial in determining the outcomes of the demonstrations has been the military's will to stand by the
regime or to defect. Consistent with Bellin's main arguments, this decision is determined by the dynamics of social mobilization and by the
structural character of the military. When the opposition is unified and
representative of the entire nation, and when it pursues nonviolent tactics, it becomes much more difficult for the military to justify violent
repression. However, the will to shoot also depends on the character of
the military: when the armed forces are organized along patrimonial lines
and perceive their interests as linked to the survival of the regime, they
will be much more likely to repress the population. According to Bellin,
this has been the case with Bahrain, where most military units are predominately Sunni, thus needing the patrimony of the Sunni-dominated
government to survive; these units are bolstered by both mercenaries
from abroad and deployed Saudi troops.15 Syria is another example: the
majority of government and military forces belong to the Alawite clan—a
minority in the largely Sunni population—and it was mostly Alawi units
repressing the population.16
Independent of what factors account for the divergent outcomes in the
region, an important question is whether the lasting message of the Arab
Spring is that opposition groups are more inspired by nonviolent resistance or by violent models. This article proposes that one of the powerful
signals sent in the region by these events is that nonviolent resistance can
be more effective than violent insurgency for Islamist opposition groups.
The next section develops this argument by examining developments in
Egypt since the January 25 revolution and focusing on the case of alJama'a al-Islamiyya, an Islamist group in Egypt.

Political Openings and Incentives for Nonviolence
The large masses converging on Tahrir Square on January 25 surprised
everyone, including the Egyptian security apparatus. Although reports
indicate that police responded with live ammunition and that militants in
the Sinai attacked police and international oil pipelines, the January 25
movement remained nonviolent.17
By the summer of 2011, disillusionment with the lack of political reforms
set in, leading to a new wave of protests and clashes with the police. Yet,
in spite of marginal calls to escalate protests, the majority of groups
31
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involved in the demonstrations continued to call for nonviolent resistance, as well as civil disobedience and a rejection of violent tactics. For
instance, on July 12 nineteen political parties and coalitions issued a
joined statement calling for revolutionaries to reject violent acts and use
only peaceful methods such as strikes, hunger strikes, and civil disobedience tactics in order to ensure the victory of the revolution and not allow
the "enemies of the revolution" to promote violence and turn sympathetic
citizens against change.18
Throughout these developments, Islamist groups such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, and the Salafist groups present in
Tahrir Square explicitly disassociated themselves from violence and
focused on forming political parties and participating in elections. The
Muslim Brotherhood's rejection of violence and interest in participating
in free elections under the banner of the Freedom and Justice Party was
predictable. In its early days, the Brotherhood was associated with some
violent incidents, and its founder, Hassan al-Banna, was initially hesitant
to form a political party out of the belief that party competition divided
the ummah.19 However, the group has since evolved into a nonviolent
movement, fielding candidates in elections, forming alliances with other
parties, and developing an increasingly democratic and pluralist political
platform over the years, despite continued intimidation and repression by
the regime.20
The rigged November 2010 People's Assembly elections in Egypt marked
a major political setback for the Muslim Brotherhood. The group lost all
its seats in the parliament and 1,000 of its members were arrested.21 Left
with no access to the political system, the Brotherhood had strong incentives to join the January revolution and support the call for democratization and free elections. The 2011 election indeed paid off for the Muslim
Brotherhood. The group headed the Democratic Alliance for Egypt, which
won 47.2 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly.22
Among the Islamists running for office, the Freedom and Justice Party
represents the centrist stream. The more conservative Islamists have
united under the banner of the Islamist block, which comprises Al-Nour,
Al-Asala, and the Building and Development Party (Al-Binaa WalTanmiyya). The Islamic block gained 24.7 percent of the seats in the
recent elections. The establishment of the Building and Development
Party is a particularly interesting development in post-revolutionary
Egypt. The party was established as the political wing of al-Jama'a alIslamiyya by Tareq Al-Zumar, who until recently was serving a long
sentence for participating in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.23
32
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The Building and Development Party presents itself as an Islamist party
that takes Islam as the frame of reference, supports implementing shar'ia
laws, and believes in democracy.24 While the party rejects the separation
of religion and politics, its leaders pledge not to use violence in dealing
with any situation or with the state, and to abide by the Egyptian law and
constitution.25 The party claims that it is ready to deal with non-Islamic
parties with different beliefs from across the political spectrum, and that
it welcomes Copts to join their ranks.26 At the same time, however, the
group rejects the notion of Egypt ever having a Coptic president, arguing
that asking for a Muslim president to rule a Muslim country is no different than England demanding its ruler to be Christian.27
A cynic might suspect that having party membership open to Christians is
more of a tactical move than a genuine sign of pluralism, especially given
the fact that the group's petition to form a party was initially rejected
because its platform was based on religion, which is prohibited by law. In
the end, the group's appeal was upheld based on the fact that Article 2 of
the constitution does state that Islamic shar'ia law is the main source of
legislation, and based on the fact that membership is open to any religion.28 Whether the Building and Development Party is more or less conservative on Coptic or women's rights, the fact that it seeks to participate
in politics and vows to reject violence and abide by the Egyptian law is of
great significance, especially given the history of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya.

Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya: From Violence to Deradicalization
Before its renouncement of violence in 1997, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was
one of the most violent Islamist groups in Egypt, accounting for the
majority of terrorist attacks during the 1980s and early 1990s. The group
first emerged as a major radical actor when it united with the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad and participated in Sadat's assassination on October 6,
1981. As a result of this attack, many of the Jama'a's members and leaders
were arrested. These developments incapacitated the group and deterred
it from staging any major acts of violence during the mid-1980s. However, the Jama'a resumed its assaults in the late 1980s, after the government closed down mosques, banned propagandizing, and arrested large
numbers of Islamists in the summer of 1987.29 Between 1989 and 1995,
the group focused on attempting to assassinate prominent Egyptian figures. This included the assassination of secularist writer Farag Foda (in
1992), and several unsuccessful attempts on the lives of the Interior Minister (in 1989 and 1990), the Information Minister (in 1993), Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz (in 1994), and President Mubarak (in 1995). Starting
in the mid-1990s, the group began a violent campaign against foreign
33
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tourists, which heightened in 1996 and 1997, culminating in the November 17, 1997, Luxor attack, where fifty-seven foreign tourists and ten
Egyptians were killed.30
What motivated this violence? Inspired by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, alJama'a al-Islamiyya justified the killing of public figures and fellow
countrymen on the grounds that they were infidels (takfir). Politicians
were infidels because they accepted secular law, and fellow countrymen
could lose their status as Muslims if their writings or behavior were seen
as breaking the Islamic code of conduct.31 Thus, the Jama'a conceived of
itself as "commanding good and forbidding wrong" (hisba) in order to
bring Egyptian society as close as possible to Jama'a's interpretation of
an Islamic society.32 Politics was condemned as being Jahiliyyah (preIslamic), and participation in parliamentary politics was rejected on the
grounds that it would imply an acceptance of secularism and of the right
to legislate without Allah.33
The group's main goal was to establish an Islamic society and re-establish
the caliphate. The group regarded the Brotherhood's focus on preaching
(da'wa) as a means to do this as too soft and law-abiding.34 Both alJama'a and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad accused the Brotherhood of
becoming a domesticated movement destined to remain weak as long as it
participated in politics.35 In their view, what was needed was a vanguard
to take over state power and radically change society, as this was seen as
the only viable way to establish a truly Islamic state.36
Given the founding ideology of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and its violent
past, the current commitments of its leaders to respect the law and participate in politics through the formation of a political party become even
more significant. It must be noted, however, that the ideological change of
the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya did not come about because of the political
openings after the January 25 revolution; rather, the prospects of free
election provided the Jama'a with an opportunity to act on its new beliefs.
Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya started changing its radical discourse in 1997,
when the imprisoned leaders issued a declaration of nonviolence. After
two years of internal debate, the external and internal leadership issued a
joint communiqué that fully endorsed the nonviolent initiative. By the
end of 2008, al-Jama'a had published twenty-six books and numerous
booklets developing and explaining its ideological revisions and new doctrine, and offering a "coherent intellectual and theological position."37
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The new organizational doctrine emphasized that attempts to uphold high
standards of morality should not come at the expense of Muslim lives and
the push for shar'ia law should not compromise the peace or the prosperity of the ummah.38 The group recognized that fighting split the ummah,
harmed the interests of society, and did not achieve the goals it set out to
achieve. This meant that it became an action without meaning that would
be legally forbidden.39 Thus, the notion of takfir was abandoned because
it led to discord within the community, and the jurisprudence of jihad was
replaced with the jurisprudence of utility versus injury.40 Furthermore,
the group also accepted that declaring war or applying penalties can only
be performed by a ruler and not by any other group or individual.41 The
concept of hisba was redefined along nonviolent lines, and the group reinterpreted it as an obligation to rectify wrongdoings through peaceful
methods such as preaching.42 Within this new framework, political participation was accepted as a legitimate tool for attempting to achieve key
Islamic objectives such as implementing shar'ia laws and Islamicizing
society.
The group has justified these ideological revisions on the basis of learning
and maturing, suggesting that the radical views were based on a simplistic
reading of religious texts and a poor understanding of the realities of religion, society, and politics.43 Rashwan argues that this is perfectly plausible, especially since these ideological revisions displayed much more
refined theological arguments compared to the early writings, which had
demonstrated that the leadership did not have a good grasp of the different Islamic schools of philosophy and primarily relied on some hard-line
interpretations.44 This argument about theological learning as a mechanism of deradicalization also has a psychological dimension, as the leaders of the organizations matured from zealous youth to "tempered
middle-aged people."45
Some scholars regard the deradicalization of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya as a
form of military defeat that was spurred by the repression and decapitation of the group. Ashour suggests that intense and sustained repression
led the group to rethink the cost of violent confrontations and the theological legitimacy behind its violence.46 He argues that deradicalization
occurs when such intense and sustained repression is combined with
selective incentives and a charismatic leadership that is respected and has
a strong influence over its followers, and when the group is socialized into
nonviolent norms.47
One can argue that the main lesson learned and the impetus for ideological revisions were not primarily about theology or about the cost of violence, but about the effectiveness of violent tactics as compared to the
35
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effectiveness of nonviolent tactics. Indeed a recurring theme in the ideological revisions is the argument that violence is not cost-effective: jihad is
forbidden if it is likely to fail, and its practice needs to be evaluated based
on harm and utility. After years of violent campaigns, which took an
increasing toll on Muslims, the Jama'a failed to achieve its goal of establishing an Islamic state, and the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood
achieved far more success in both Islamicizing society and gaining access
to the political process through elections. Equally important was the fact
that public opinion became increasingly critical of the radical cause. As
Al-Sayyid remarks, the Jama'a had a choice "between armed resistance
without prospect for success in the short and medium term and use of a
political process that affords a good opportunity of victory in the medium
or long term."48
The present political openings in Egypt in the aftermath of the January 25
revolution and the ability of the Jama'a to establish a political party, participate in an Islamic alliance, and win seats in the People's Assembly
have arguably given the group significantly more influence and legitimacy
than the years of violent campaigns. Thus, one of the strongest signals
sent by the Arab Spring to Islamist opposition movements in the region,
especially in light of Islamist political gains in both Egypt and Tunisia, is
that nonviolent political participation is a more effective tactic than violent insurgency. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the recent electoral results in Egypt, it would indeed be very difficult for a group to argue
that given political openings, political participation is too soft and ineffective a tactic, and that a violent takeover of the regime is necessary. In
other words, the Arab Spring and the electoral victory of Islamists can
serve to discredit radical voices and to give credence to prodemocratic
forces and to nonviolent Islamist groups that are willing to play by the
rules and pursue their goals through electoral means. As Elman points
out, once Islamists participate in the political system, electoral rules that
provide incentives to appeal to the median voter can continue the trend of
discrediting radical voices.49
The signal about the effectiveness of nonviolent tactics is likely to reverberate across the region, especially since the history of the Jama'a indicates that even radical hard-line groups are adaptable and open to
learning. They learn not only from their own experience, but also from the
experience of other Islamist groups inside and outside the country. This
being said, it is equally important not to fall pray to teleological arguments and to recognize under what circumstances the appeal of nonviolent resistance would be limited.
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Cautious Optimism: Internal versus External
Threats
The Missing Revolution in the Palestinian Territories
The Palestinian Territories provide an interesting case for reflecting on
the limitations of the democratic and nonviolent contagion effect set off
by the Arab Spring. As protests spread across the Middle East and North
Africa, Palestinians also began organizing in March of 2011, but these
demonstrations did not escalate into a full-blown revolution and societywide mobilization.
According to Salem, sixty new groups of Palestinian youth have started
mobilizing through Facebook and Twitter since March 2011.50 What is
interesting about the Palestinian mobilization efforts is that their messages have been different than the predominant messages in protests
across the region, which have all been generally focused on replacing
authoritarian rulers and democratizing the political system. In Egypt, for
example, the main message has been clear and simple from day one: the
people want Mubarak out.51 In the Palestinian Territories, on the other
hand, the March 15 movement started out by calling for national unity
and an end to the Fatah-Hamas split, after which it started calling for an
end to the occupation and the right of return for refugees.52 Thus, the Palestinian demonstrations focused on healing rifts rather than removing a
regime, and they also combined domestic and external concerns, along
with demands for both domestic and foreign actors.
On one hand, it seems obvious that Palestinians would be making
demands that are relevant to their most salient problems, since demonstrations typically reflect specific local grievances. On the other hand,
however, when a revolutionary message has multiple dimensions and
seeks several goals and targets different actors, it is far less likely to mobilize a unified national front, and it is far less likely to be successful.
The slogans of the Palestinian protesters as well as public opinion polls
show that the unified call for democratization and removal of the regime
did not resonate in the Palestinian Territories, because the primary concerns of the Palestinian public are the lack of state and the occupation.
For the public, the primary enemy is not the regime per se, but rather the
lack of a unified regime and the presence of an external enemy, Israel.
Public opinion polls from 2011 show that Palestinians considered the creation of a state, rather than democratization, the most important goal for
their country.53
37
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In this context, the public resonance of nonviolent tactics is more limited.
When it comes to domestic reforms, the Palestinian public is indeed
pushing for an abandonment of violence and factionalism and calling for
national reconciliation. This demand was met with some success, as both
Hamas and Fatah started working towards a unity government in the
aftermath of the demonstrations. However, given the fact that the public
seems primarily concerned about the occupation, the lessons from Tunisia and Egypt are hardly applicable. Indeed, in examining public opinion,
only a slight shift was observable in opposition to armed attacks against
Israeli civilians after March 2011; there was not a drastic transformation
of attitudes towards the utility or legitimacy of violence against Israel.54
When asked about the potential effectiveness of peaceful demonstrations,
about 60 percent of Gazans and just under 50 percent of West Bankers
thought that these tactics could speed up the end of the occupation, but
less than 30 percent of West Bankers and around 45 percent of Gazans
thought that a peaceful revolt could bring the occupation to an end.55
Such numbers are important, but not enough to mobilize the entire society. In other words, while Tunisia and Egypt inspired Palestinians to get
out on the streets, the most important signals that led to a contagion
effect elsewhere in the region (that authoritarian regimes are vulnerable
and can be toppled through nonviolent resistance) were not as resonant
for the Palestinian public.
The two major political actors traditionally mobilizing the Palestinian
population currently each represent "the regime" in West Bank and Gaza
accordingly. While the public is concerned about the occupation and
regards Israel as the major threat, Hamas and Fatah are primarily concerned about each other. As Bloom points out, the strategies of the major
political actors in the Palestinian Territories are primarily determined by
the dynamics of the competition among them and the continuous attempt
to "outbid" each other.56
In light of the Arab Spring, Hamas and Fatah might try to outbid each
other through nonviolent tactics in order to be able to work towards a
unity government and send the message to the international community
that they are aligned with the nonviolent spirit of the Arab Spring. Indeed,
Hamas has declared that the "non-violent approach is part of a strategy
for our present situation to draw world sympathy to our cause."57 Yet,
speaking in Tehran, Haniyeh also declared that the group is not willing to
permanently renounce armed resistance against Israel.58 For smaller
groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, violent tactics and spoiling
strategies might be the most effective option to undermine Hamas's rule
in Gaza and Fatah's discourse.
38
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In the Palestinian context, we can thus identify three conditions that have
prevented the revolutionary zeal of the Arab Spring from cascading into
widespread prodemocratic mobilization. First, the Palestinian public is
relatively more concerned about external threats than their neighbors in
the region. Second, Palestinians have multiple concerns that extend well
beyond the lack of democratic governance, and their grievances are targeted at both domestic and foreign actors. Third, the absence of rule of
law and of effective state institutions provides Palestinian political actors
with incentives to compete against each other through any means, including violence.

The Broader Relevance of External Threats
The issue of external versus internal threats and priorities is relevant
when considering not just public sentiments, but also the calculations of
the pro–status quo forces and the considerations of Islamist opposition
groups. Some scholars have suggested, for example, that a major concern
that is emerging in the Gulf region is the rise of Shia power and growing
Iranian influence, which are affecting the responses to demonstrations
and, ultimately, the course of the Arab Spring.59 This could explain not
just the decision of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to send
troops to suppress demonstrations in Bahrain, but also the decision of the
Bahraini military to defend the monarchy and suppress demonstrations.
As Barany points out, the Bahraini military is not a national army but
rather "a fighting force of Sunni Muslims who are charged with protecting
a Sunni ruling family and Sunni political and business elites in a country
that majority-Shia Iran has officially claimed as a province since 1957, and
where about three of every four or five people are Shia."60
External factors can also affect the considerations of Islamist groups. Outside of the Middle East and North Africa, the prospects of democratization and political participation did not moderate internationally-oriented
militant groups such as the Indonesian Jama'a Islamiyya, who in the
aftermath of democratization embarked on a series of violent terrorist
attacks. Since the 1990s, the group has shifted its focus from domestic
issues and imposing shar'ia law to targeting the "far enemy," and it has
developed a multinational constituency and established bases of support
outside of the country.61 Given this broadening of priorities and constituency, repression could not fully decapitate the group, and democratization did not offer the international constituency enough incentives to
abandon violent tactics.
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Similar dynamics can also play out in the Middle East for groups that are
part of global jihadist networks and are primarily focused on the far
enemy rather than on implementing domestic shar'ia laws and Islamicizing a national audience. Broad internationalist goals such as establishing
a caliphate, however, are difficult if not impossible to reach. Therefore, as
groups with more limited and domestic-oriented goals make progress in
reforming society and local or national laws to reflect Islamic principles,
even internationally oriented groups can learn and adapt accordingly. If
such learning occurs, the scales can tip in the favor of nonviolent resistance in the long run.

Conclusion
The initial victories in Tunisia and Egypt sent a strong and important signal that nonviolent tactics can be effective and bring about political
change. As demonstrations spread across the region, their success has
been mixed, reinforcing the fact that outcomes are determined not just by
the number and power of protesters but also by the strength and resolve
of the regime and pro–status quo forces. Even in light of setbacks, however, the recent electoral wins of Islamist parties continue to send a strong
signal that nonviolent Islamist strategies can be more effective than violent insurgencies. In considering the future of the Arab Spring and of
democratization in the region, it is important to keep in mind not just
domestic considerations but also external threats and regional dynamics.
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